

## **THE FAILED OF CITY: HOW THE MAYOR MAKE CORRUPTION MORE MASSIVE IN THE PEKANBARU**

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### **ABSTRACT**

Corruption is a problem that does not stand-alone. This is because corruption can be done through a variety of actions, both individually and collectively. What we can understand is the dimensions of corruption must start from an understanding of the actor, the type of action and the nature of corruption itself. The need for an understanding of the environment and the contours of corruption in a case is the fundamental basics for designing appropriate strategies to prevent corruption. This opinion seems to reinforce that corruption has a diverse background dimension so this demands a person who wants to explore the problem of corruption in particular case should understand this.

This paper describes how Mayor of Pekanbaru, an Indonesian city, has been failed to curbing corruption. Pekanbaru has selected because the corruption in Pekanbaru even seems to have worsened since 2006 based on several surveys. According to the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) by Transparency International Indonesia, Pekanbaru have decline gradually in the eradication of corruption in 2006 (4.43), 2008 (3.55), and 2010 (3.61). The setback in the fight against corruption in Pekanbaru is in line with a public sector integrity survey on city by the Corruption Eradication Commission in 2008 (7.19 or rank 20 out of 52), 2011 (6.51 or rank 26 out of 60) and 2013 (6.05 rank of 57 out of 60).

In this paper, the author argue that the massive of corruption by Mayor in the Pekanbaru has been indicated by the corrupt relations with various formal actors such as inspectorate, local parliament, audit agencies, and judicial figures. That situation has occurred because lack of accountability and weak of integrity among them. Moreover, less of public sphere to criticize corruption issue by informal actors such as non government organizations, civil society organizations, local media, and scholars allow the situation more worst, otherwise they have involved to doing corruption by receive a huge amount of grants by Mayor. Consequently, the problem of corruption in the Pekanbaru should be recognized as a complex issue to be solved.

**Keywords:** corruption, Mayor, accountability.

### **Introduction**

There is intriguing question when it comes to corruption. What will you think about it? Will you say that this act is very bad or immoral, closely related to bribery, or about abuse of power, or even other bad things? If one of those answers crosses your mind, this means corruption has a negative tendency. Negative perception of corruption cannot be neglected from many discussions in public domains that highlight corruption as one of the crucial issues


to be resolved. Not surprisingly, the survey of Transparency International (TI) shows there have been more than 4,000 books and journal articles that discuss corruption as a major theme in the last ten years (Luo in Ritcher & Burke, 2007). In the same survey, corruption becomes the theme in 74% of publications in the viewpoint of political and public administrative capacity, 10% in the historical point of view, 9% in legal point of view, 4% in economic point of view, 2% in ethnography and culture point of view and 1% in business ethics (Luo in Ritcher & Burke, 2007). The high interest in publications on the theme of corruption cannot be separated from the role of the countries worldwide that are aware of the urgency of the corruption issues today.

In the Indonesian case, many experts have involved to study in corruption issues in local levels such as Aceh (Aspinall, 2009), Kupang (Tidey, 2012), and Pekalongan (Savirani in Klinken & Berenschot 2014). However, the study of corruption is a research area that still requires further investigation. It is important to conduct such research, because the trend of corruption is still high. According to the compilation of Corruption Perception Index by Transparency International Indonesia on 2006, 2008 and 2010, 85 percent of the Indonesia local governments got a score less than 5 on a scale of 0-10 with zero meaning highly corrupt and 10 being clean (Karyadi *et al*, 2006; Simanjuntak, 2008; Transparency International Indonesia, 2010). Pekanbaru-Riau is one of the worst areas with low score in 2006 (4.43), 2008 (3.55), and 2010 (3.61). Therefore, more in-depth concerns are required to explore the pattern of corruption within the context of Pekanbaru as one of worst Indonesian local government.

### **Pekanbaru in Brief**

The Pekanbaru is located in the central of Sumatera Island. The Pekanbaru situated on the banks of Siak River. Its region with an area of 632.26 sq KM is also crossed by rivers such as Umban Sari River, Air Hitam River, Sibam River, and Setukul River. Many rivers that cross Pekanbaru make this city be positioned as a strategic crossing area between Padang-Indonesia, Malacca-Malaysia, Johor-Malaysia, and Singapore. Moreover, the structure of the region dominated by lowland makes Pekanbaru easy to develop as a city.

**Picture 1**  
**Pekanbaru Map**



Source:

<https://www.google.nl/maps/place/Pekanbaru,+Pekanbaru+City,+Riau,+Indonesia/@0.2516725,101.4050702,9.25z/data=!4m2!3m1!1s0x31d5ab80690ee7b1:0x94dde92c3823dbe4>

The city has existed for over 200 years and, for the majority of that time it was a small village named Senapelan (Suryadi, 2005). Pekanbaru was formerly better known by the name 'Senapelan' which at the time was led by a chief called Batin. The Batin was the traditional leader for the tribe he led. Based on the record of Suhil Siak, the use of the name Pekanbaru was initiated in 1784 when the area was occupied by King Muhammad Ali. Pekanbaru was originated from the words Pekan and Baharu that have meaning New Market (Suwardi etc, 2006). Today, Pekanbaru is capital of Riau Province which has population 999,031 people (CBS, 2014). Its total population has increased significantly by 90% in just the last fifteen years, ie, 523.076 people in the year 1998 (CBS, 2014). The significant growth signifies that Pekanbaru is a destination that attracts many people.

Typically as an urban area, Pekanbaru has heterogeneous ethnicities. Minang ethnic (38%) is the majority population followed Malay (27%), Javanese (15%), and Batak (10%) in 2000 (Ford in Aspinall & Fealy, 2003). However the Malay is ethnic claims as a native of Pekanbaru, in contrast minang as majority group is ethnic come from West Sumatera, the neighbouring region. Ethnic tensions have risen because malay as a native not receive economic benefit at their regions during Suharto regime (Wee, 2002). This sharp ethnicity claim that sometimes occurs in the community leads to the bulkhead significantly, especially the mounting conditions after decentralization in 1999 which granted greater autonomy to the region by the central government (Ford in Aspinall & Fealy, 2003). As a result, Malay ethnic group features domination and exclusivity, and tends to bang its ethnic background to the other ethnic groups in social interaction in the government. The primordial tension like that

is still occurring in the recruitment of officer in the bureaucracy. The spirit of recruitment tends to support '*Putra Kampar*' (native people) as top position in bureaucracy. As a result, the sensitivity of public to control corruption is weak because they want to protect the government officers based on spirit of ethnicity.

The high number of corruption in Pekanbaru government is not separated from the democratization wave in Indonesia at 1998. After the fall of Soeharto from the presidency after 32 years in power, the corruption pattern in the local government changed. The charges against granting broad autonomy to the local as one of the six reform agenda were inevitable. The areas that had been storing deep disappointment over the uneven development that was too centralized in Jakarta voiced dissatisfaction over the centralistic government also threw an issue of Riau Freedom from various figures in Pekanbaru (Ford in Aspinall & Fealy, 2003). Responding to the demands, Act No. 22 of 1999 and Act No. 25 of 1999 were not only changing in the nomenclature of naming the local government from municipality into city, but also granting greater autonomy and a stronger financial support to local areas. Granting autonomy not only made local areas' development faster, but also increased local government corruption and bore little kings in local areas (Ford in Aspinall & Fealy, 2003).

The corrupt government in Pekanbaru is not only evidenced by the figures of KPK's Integrity Index and TI's Corruption Perception Index, but also reinforced with the Pekanbaru public perception itself. Perception from various informants against the corrupt city government was represented by lack of corruption in local government which was appointed to the court (Interview Riau Pos, 1 February 2015), the poor quality of public infrastructure (Interview Fitra, 2 February 2015), recruitment of civil servants which was laden with corruption, collusion and nepotism (Interview Lawyer, 6 February 2015), some local officials imposed as convicted of corruption cases, the cost of public services that was not transparent (Interview Sulastri, 25 February 2015), and the practice of informal charges against construction projects undertaken by private sectors (Interview Gapensi, 12 February 2015). As result, the pattern of corruption in the government of Pekanbaru is spread in the all level. The massive corruption has involved the Mayor and Vice Mayor with support by Senior Secretary as the highest position within the government officer.

### **The Corrupt Relations between Mayor and Other Actors**

Many studies conclude that actors have a strategic position to participate in enhancing accountability to curbing corruption (Yang, 2011). Related to this, the existence of accountability in the Pekanbaru government depends their responsibility of action and performance taken to other actors. Therefore, it is important to analyse the role from various actors to control Pekanbaru local governments.

Formally, there are nine state institutions, which can perform control against the Pekanbaru Government. The number of state institutions is due a) the presence of internally institutional audit mechanisms such as local inspectorate), b) political legitimacy given by public to execute the control against the Pekanbaru Government such as local parliament (DPRD), c) as the position of the government above the Pekanbaru Government such as province government, police, local attorney, Corruption Eradication Commision (KPK),Supreme Audit Board (BPK), Board of Supervisors Finance and Development (BPKP) and ombudsman. Therefore, it is important to identify the extent of the role of various state institutions in monitoring the Pekanbaru Government.

Inspectorate has an internal watchdog function to government. Its function is in running

supervision that includes the supervision of the financial sector and performance in all levels ranging from the mayor to the staffs in the Pekanbaru Government. In order to carry out its function, the Inspectorate of Pekanbaru has been consist by four internal departments. However, the inspectorate structure institutionally is weak. Act No. 32 of 2004 explains that only the mayor and vice mayor who has direct authority to conduct internal control for each actor in local governments. This makes the city inspectorate not have a strong authority to implement direct control to other actors, including the mayor and vice mayor. This position makes the tasks and functions (duties) of inspectorate not be maximized to control the Mayor, Vice Mayor and offices that should be supervised. The independence of the inspectorate in the supervision will always be blasted with some cultural feelings to the leaders and colleagues. The weakness of bargaining position of the inspectorate affects the output of the supervision function that becomes not optimal because of merely the fulfilment of a routine work rather than efforts to prevent corruption concretely. The inspectorate handling corruption issues in bureaucracy is very permissive. Even, if there are findings, the inspectorate does not follow up more seriously in the realm of legal. With no follow-up to the problems in the realm of legal, it indicates the inspectorate can be considered more concerned with protecting the interests of the corps rather than encouraging the government to be more transparent and be able to be audited by many parties.

In addition to the inspectorate, DPRD has a vital position in the prevention of corruption in the Pekanbaru Local Government. The Act No. 32 of 2004 provides space to DPRD as an external agency to encourage the creation of accountability in local governments. In this view, local parliament has control functions in addition to legislation function and budget function. The implication is that local governments should be accountable to DPRD, at least by giving report on accountability every end of year. Supervision done by the DPRD also involves the possibility of sanctions. As an equal partner of the Mayor and Vice Mayor, the members of DPRD as local legislators can run the control rights that attach to prevent corruption. The control rights are politically stronger as the rights recognized in law so that DPRD should be able to effectively play an oversight function. The existence of four commissions in DPRD in partnership with all offices in the Pekanbaru Government should not be a mere routine forum; otherwise, it can maximize the forum to warn offices in order to not corrupt.

The fact that happens is inversely. DPRD is actually involved in the corruption problems. The game in setting the design of budget until claiming the project is some mode of corruption committed by the legislators. A strong bargaining position in the Law is exchanged with pragmatic interests. There are 60% of the legislators who have background as contractors so that DPRD is not more as their political vehicle for corruption. When the DPRD makes its function as barter of political interest, DPRD has marginalized the essence of parliament as an institution elected by the people that should fight for the people's interests. Instead, DPRD also collaborates with the executive in committing corruption.

It is interesting to observe that DPRD of Pekanbaru is always dominated by one party, ie, Golkar Party within the last three elections in 2004 (12 out of 45 seats), 2009 (7 out of 45 seats), and 2014 (7 out of 45 seats). For the record, only elections in 2009 Demokrat Party had a number of seats equal to Golkar Party as many as seven seats. From the trend of composition of seats in DPRD of Pekanbaru, Golkar as the ruling party can influence the policy made by the Mayor. The analysis is not weak because the dominance of Golkar Party in parliament is followed by the length of their power at the peak position of the executive, ie, the Mayor (2001-2011) and the governor (1998-present). The pattern indicates the existence of a hegemonic power in the local political context which is systematically built on the

support of the local bureaucracy, community groups, etc. The hegemony makes corruption becomes difficult to eradicate.

Futhermore, the province government function will be difficult to control Pekanbaru eventhough Pekanbaru is one of local governments in Riau Province. Based on Law No 25 of 2014, the Governor may act as a representative of the central government in an area who can do monitoring, evaluation and supervision of the local governments. According to province inspectorate report, there are 139 violations found in the Pekanbaru in the period 2010 to 2014 (Summary Report of Findings, Causes, Recommendations and Follow-up of Provincial Inspectorate, 2015). However, such authority is not followed by the authority to impose sanctions against the government officials proven committing corruption. As a result, the role of the Province as the frontline in efforts to prevent corruption in the city level becomes difficult. This condition more difficult because the lack of human resources owned by the province government in conducting an audit against the agencies in the Pekanbaru Government. According to Provincial Inspectorate Profile, there are 42 persons who have competency as non-financial auditor (P2PD) and only 5 persons who have competency as an financial auditor.

The weakness of human resources owned by the provincial inspectorate is compounded by the inability to open cases of corruption that exist in Riau Provincial Government itself. Three previous Governors of Riau Province are arrested by in a corruption case respectively, ie, Saleh Djasit in 2008, Rusli Zainal in 2013), and Anas Maamun (2014) (<http://nasional.tempo.co/read/news/2014/09/26/078609868/musibah-besar-3-gubernur-riau-berakhir-di-kpk>). This fact indicates that the supervisory role of the provincial inspectorate does not have a strong impact in the oversight of behaviour of irregularities of corruption in the Pekanbaru Government.

In addition to the inspectorate, there are several other state institutions that function as external auditors for local governments, ie, BPK and BPKP. Supreme Audit Board (BPK) and Board of Supervisors Finance and Development (BPKP) (BPKP) are a government audit agency which is tasked to audit local governments. The similar function of BPK and BPKP as audit bodies also containing the specific purpose of auditing the procurement of goods and services. By tracing the financial expenditure, the government is more likely to reveal theft and fraud than bribery (Smith, 2007).

Based on Law No 15 of 2006, BPK is a state high institution domiciled in parallel with the President with the primary task of checking the management and state institutions' finance. The scope of BPK audit is expanded post Indonesia reform, from the previously only serving as an auditor merely for the central government funding to be a financial and compliance auditor on the financial reports of public institutions both the central government, provincial government, city government, state enterprises and local enterprises (Dwiputrianti, 2013). The presence of the auditing scope change makes BPK have representatives in each

In its function, BPK runs financial supervising of the Pekanbaru Government. BPK issues a report of inspection results annually accompanied by giving an opinion on the financial report provided by the Pekanbaru government. Assessment on the financial report is divided into four levels from the highest to the lowest which are accepted accepted with conditional, adverse, dan disclaimer (Summary of audit report by BPK no. 1, 2014). Meanwhile, the opinion of the financial report received by the Pekanbaru Government only achieve "accepted with conditional" opinion with exception in the period 2010 to 2015 (<http://pekanbaru.tribunnews.com/2015/06/01/firdaus-ayat-memimpin-pemko-pekanbaru-tak->

pernah-mendapat-opini-wtp) and only in 2009 the Pekanbaru Government achieved “accepted opinion” with no exception (<http://www.suluhriau.com/read-194225-2014-07-08-.html>).

The decreased achievement of the Pekanbaru Government based on the assessment occurred by BPK is inseparable from the various problems that can be summarized as follows:

**Table 2**  
**The audit report results of the Pekanbaru Local Government by BPK from 2010-2013**

| <b>2010</b>  |
|--|
| Money which was not deposited yet by the local secretariat and PPKD was IDR Rp. 6,831,845,378  |
| A report of Pekanbaru Local Government’s capital participation to a Microfinance board of Tuah Negeri was not presented yet for IDR Rp. 3,148,489,752  |
| Difference in value of fixed assets was IDR Rp.191.306.965.624   |
| Deviations of social assistance for funding official travels were IDR Rp. 2,643,834,000  |
| <b>2011</b>  |
| The Pekanbaru Local Government did not report yet the drug supply in the health office and registration form in the civil registry office for IDR Rp. 2,330,002,934                                    |
| Difference in value of fixed assets was IDR Rp. 654,312,992,450  |
| Deviations of social assistance or unauthorized parties amounted to IDR Rp 78,000,000 and IDR Rp 883,000,000,000 of the social assistance was given to parties who did not have a clear identity       |
| <b>2012</b>  |
| There was absence of strong evidence against the levy received from building permit for IDR Rp. 5,209,701,460  |
| There was no evidence against the balance of non-permanent investments for IDR Rp. 4,769,915,062   |
| Difference in value of fixed assets was IDR Rp. 881,176,931,350  |
| Deviations of social assistance for those who were not eligible were IDR Rp. 347,000,000 and IDR Rp 3,559,050,000,000 of the social assistance was provided to those who did not have a clear identity |
| <b>2013</b>  |

There was absence of strong evidence against the levy received from building permit for IDR Rp. 4,411,904,660

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A violation of participating capital for six local enterprises amounted IDR Rp.38,142,536,916 that did not have local regulations as a legal umbrella

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Difference in value of fixed assets was Rp.1,154,308,849,505

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Grants to social organizations / groups for IDR Rp. 24,623,123,505 was not accounted for yet and IDR Rp. 3,250,000,000 was not according to the provisions

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Subsidizing development of IDR Rp. 9,000,000,000 was not in accordance with the provisions

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Deviations of social assistance that did not fit the designation were IDR Rp 912,000,000, and IDR Rp 462,500,000,000 was not in accordance with provisions as well as IDR Rp. 137,500,000 social assistance remained unaccounted

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Source: BPK, 2010-2013

From the table 2, we can see that BPK always finds similar problems each year related to financial irregularities committed by the Pekanbaru Local Government. Although the findings of the BPK contain detailed information, the audit done by BPK is felt not to become firm guidelines against the Pekanbaru Local Government to correct the mistakes that have been made. BPK has low bargaining position against the Pekanbaru Local Government because many recommendations for improvement are not followed up. Based on the BPK recapitulation reports in the period 2005-2009, of 69 findings, only 28 could be resolved by the Pekanbaru Local Government, the remaining 41 findings were not resolved. These conditions make BPK have to force the government more to open the audit report of the Pekanbaru Local Government's finance to the public in order to be widely known. BPK Audit Reports to the Pekanbaru Local Government are classified as a state document that can be accessed by the public in accordance with Law No. 14/2008 on the disclosure of information.

In contrast to BPK, BPKP is a state institution under the President (the president's subordinate) that serves as an internal supervision and as auditor of other executive institutions including the city government (Dwiputrianti, 2012). Although the overlapping of authority between BPK and BPKP is unavoidable, BPKP is recognized to have advantages in terms of the utilization of modern technology and human resources, including the number of auditors who have good qualifications in auditing (Dwiputrianti, 2012). However, based on Presidential Decree No 103 of 2001, BPKP can conduct audits only if BPKP is requested by the related government institutions, in this context, city government. These rules make BPKP not have the initiative to carry out supervision and assistance if not requested by the Government.

Furthermore, the governments are also possible to obtain legal investigation and prosecution by the local Attorney, the Police and the corruption eradication commission when indicated committing corruption or financial irregularities. Existing laws have been



configured into a structured system by creating new institutions to support the fight against corruption.

The role of local police in handling corruption in the city of Pekanbaru can be said minimum. From BPKP report, there is no request for investigations against suspected acts of corruption in the Pekanbaru Government conducted by the police in the city level. However, the requests are coming from the Provincial Police. This leads to an impression that city police's performance in fighting corruption in the Pekanbaru Government is weak. The weak performance of the city police is in line with the following table:

**Table 3**  
**The recapitulation of corruption cases investigation by police**

| Year | Number of report and summary of report   | Name of Suspect                  | Total Losses                            | Agency            |
|------|--|----------------------------------|---|-------------------|
| 2009 | LP/ 117/ XI/ 2009/ Reskrim, date 09 Nov 2009<br>Alleged Grants Abuse of the Pekanbaru City Government in 2009 by the Election Supervisory Committee of Pekanbaru City  | AHMAD<br>ALI<br>DJUNAEDI,<br>DKK | IDR Rp.<br>168,650,000/<br>US \$ 12,046 | Provincial Police |
| 2011 | Police Report No. Pol :LP/ 693 / V / 2011/ Reskrim, date 09 Mei 2011<br>Deviation of salaries of hygiene janitors and allowances of hygiene of religious holidays in the Village of Tebing Tinggi Okura, sub-district of Rumbai Pesisir, Pekanbaru that sourced from local budget of Pekanbaru FY 2010 | EKA<br>TRISILA                   | IDR Rp.<br>5,615,000/ US<br>\$ 401      | City Police       |

Source: Reskrim Polda Riau, 2015

Table 3 explains recapitulation of case submission in the Pekanbaru Government in the period of 2006 to 2014. From the table we see that only two cases of corruption can be proposed by police for eight years, where one case with the low ammount is submitted by the city police while the larger nominal is submitted by provincial police. Of course, the lack of achievement of the police in combating corruption raises public pessimism.

The lack of accomplishment of city police is alleged because police's interests are accommodated both institutionally and personally by the mayor in the various policies. Based on data from budget realization reports of the Pekanbaru Government, City Police received a grant of IDR Rp. 3,077,559,465/ US \$ 219,826 (2011), 1,000,000,000/ US \$ 71,429 (2012), 1,000,000,000/ US \$ 71,429 (2013), and 1,000,000,000/ US \$ 71,429 (2014). Not only that, the city police chief is also given a loan facility in the form of luxurious car costing IDR Rp. 426 million/ US \$ 30,429 from the Mayor sourced from the local budget of the city of Pekanbaru. Gratification practices undertaken by the Mayor are not just borrowing the car even in some cases the car is removed in the city asset reports that this can be defined that the asset has changed into personal asset. Evasion modes of the city government's assets into

private assets including cars are recognized to often be encountered in financial irregularities in the local. This collaboration between law enforcement and the Mayor makes the investigation of cases of corruption in the city of Pekanbaru minimal.

The collaboration between the mayor and law enforcement is actually not separated from the existence of the communication forum of regional leaders (*Forkopimda*). Based on Law 23, 2014, the Mayor with the leaders of DPRD, the head of police, the head of attorney, territorial head of the Indonesian National Army and leaders of vertical institutions are joined in *Forkopimda* that is aimed as a medium of communication and coordination between the leaders in the areas in order to support the smooth implementation of the governance. However, the presence of *forkopimda* is often misused for the benefit of the mayor with the leaders of other institutions.

*Forkopimda* is a medium of conspiracy among the rulers in the area to jointly commit corruption. *Forkopimda* makes ineffective supervision, where the formal state institutions often turn a blind eye against the abuses that can easily occur in local government. The existence of local government supported by the authority of financial and political resources makes either the head of the area or a rank of apparatus who are below the head vulnerable to 'play dirt' to the actor who should perform the function of monitoring.

*Forkopimda* utilization as a medium of exchange of interests' makes the Mayor may intervene when the bureaucratic led by him is indicated corrupt. The Mayor will continue to meet the personal demands of the leaders of other institutions who join as members of the *forkopimda*. Based on the findings of BPK in 2015, the Head of General Attorney of Pekanbaru allegedly received a vehicle from the Pekanbaru Local Government but not recorded as a local government asset (<http://pekanbaru.tribunnews.com/2015/06/16/kajari-pekanbaru-kami-tak-pernah-terima-kendaraan-dari-pemko>). The practices of fulfilling personal demands make supervision that should promote the principle of check and balance on each of the leaders of institutions become loose. The mayor and leaders joining in *Forkopimda* realize that *Forkopimda* can reinforce their existence of power hegemony in the region with the absence of party who conducts control. The existence of *forkopimda* makes anyone who becomes the head of the city police not only become an equal partner of the Mayor but also become a part for protecting the corrupt practices of the mayor as along as the request is accommodated.

Along with the police, the local attorney of Pekanbaru also becomes law enforcement officers who can perform the function of investigation of corruption cases in the Pekanbaru government. According to the local attorney report in the period from 2009 to 2014, the numbers of corruption suspects determined by the local Attorney are 3 suspects (2009), 5 suspects (2010), 14 suspects (2011), 9 suspects (2012), 11 suspects (2013), and 22 suspects (2014). Based on that, the number of suspects increased significantly in the last six years. The last case handled by the local Attorney receiving widespread public attentions is a corruption case of bus order in public transportation of Pekanbaru city involving the head of the communication and information transportation department of Pekanbaru (<http://www.riauterkini.com/hukum.php?arr=64016>).

Nonetheless, the performance of the prosecutor in law enforcement is still recognized weak. Similar with the treatment given to the police chief, the mayor also lends one unit of luxurious car to the head of local attorney as an operational vehicle like in the Picture 4. It is no doubt it is an attempt of the Mayor to not open the case of corruption in the Pekanbaru Government.

**Picture 4**  
**The head of local Attorney car in the front of Pekanbaru Attorney Office**



Souce: Private, 2015

Moreover, the head of local attorney has cuts the office budget in the corruption investigation. The reason of head of local attorney to cut the budget is for ‘serving’ people from Jakarta (a attorney from the central office). As a result, the prosecutors are forced to seek additional money from a variety of sources including corruption cases handled. Approximately, IDR Rp. 5 million/ US \$ 357 must be obtained each day by one of local attorney on his position.

Some institutions are also created after the reform in Indonesia as response to the lack of public confidence towards the existence of institutions that have existed previously. Since 2002, KPK has been established in the functions as investigation and prosecution of any state actor. As a new institution, KPK’s performance in eradicating corruption in Riau Province gains broad public appreciation because of its success in capturing a number of regional heads in Riau. In the provincial government levels, KPK is able to arrest three governors of Riau Province respectively, ie, Saleh Djasit in 2008, Rusli Zainal in 2014 and Annas Mamun in 2014 (<http://www.jpnn.com/read/2014/09/26/260313/Sudah-3-Gubernur-Riau-Ditangkap-KPK->). The arrests of the three Riau Governors are termed by the public as “hatrick” of KPK in eradicating corruption in Riau.

However, the achievements obtained by KPK in the disclosure of corruption cases in the level of provincial government of Riau do not continue in the level of the Pekanbaru City Government. KPK has not succeeded yet in revealing cases of corruption against the Government of Pekanbaru City. The lack of KPK’s role to detect problems of corruption in the Pekanbaru Government because two reasons. The first reason is the KPK officers have bribe the Mayor and Previous Mayor with the huge amount of money. One informant stated that:

“It is secret information, the previous Mayor gave IDR Rp. 3 billion/ US \$ 214,286 and current Mayor gave IDR Rp. 4 billion/ US \$ 285,714 to KPK officers to closing the investigation of corruption indication by them. The Mayor make order to all head of office to collect the money for KPK. The Mayor afraid to KPK because there are issue that KPK has released the letter of investigation to current mayor (*surat perintah penyelidikan/ sprindik*). However, the letter is never found until now” (Confidential Interview Department of Legal, 2 March 2015).

This statement is difficult to clarify to KPK and the Mayor. However, several head of department are safe in the bureaucratic position until now for compensation after support the Mayor. Second, the KPK is inseparable from the constraints of organizational nomenclature because of the KPK structure is only domiciled in Jakarta. KPK is placed as a super body institution that is only domiciled in Jakarta because the range for monitoring is hard. This becomes a dilemma because the performance of other law enforcement institutions that have representatives in the region, ie, police and local attorney has not able to meet public expectations as done by KPK.

In contrast, the Ombudsman was also established in public advocacy function since 2008. Based on Law No. 37 of 2008 on the Ombudsman of the Republic of Indonesia, regional ombudsman has a strategic position to enhance the capacity of public service implementation in order to have good local governance. It is according to the function of the Ombudsman in article 6 of Law No. 37 of 2008 which is overseeing the implementation of public service held by the state apparatus and government at both central and regional levels.

The position of ombudsman in Indonesia which is in every provincial capital city has implications for the establishment of the Ombudsman in Pekanbaru considering Pekanbaru is the capital city of Riau province. Ombudsman in Pekanbaru was established in 2012. The main tasks of the Ombudsman in Pekanbaru are 1) receiving reports from the public on suspicion of mal administration in public service implementation, 2) conducting the examination on the substance of the reports submitted, 3) following-up report submitted, 4) conducting an investigation by self-initiative (own-motion investigation), 5) conducting cooperation and coordination with state institutions or governments and social institutions, and 6) building networks especially in efforts to prevent mal administration by disseminating both among governments and universities in the city of Pekanbaru.

Like a new organization that is growing, people's understanding of the importance of ombudsman in Pekanbaru has gradually gained public attention. Based on the number of complaints received by the Ombudsman, 30 cases (2013) and 41 cases (2014) addressed to the offices of the Pekanbaru government. The number of complaints is followed up with clarification by ombudsman to Pekanbaru government. In practice, the Ombudsman has never committed a forced clarification to the Pekanbaru Government. The calls from the Ombudsman when responded by the offices in Pekanbaru Government indicate that the ombudsman has a pretty good bargaining position to voice public complaints. Although the working principle of the ombudsman is not repressive in which the settlement of complaints is settled outside the realm of law, the Pekanbaru Government remains willing to cooperate. Mediation offered by the ombudsman is a different approach to the Pekanbaru Government to improve accountability.

The weakness of the Pekanbaru Ombudsman is caused by various main constraints. The

first constraint is limited human resources. Human resources working in the Ombudsman only consists of six people including a chief of representative of the Ombudsman, three assistants, one multifunctional, and one security. From six staff, only four people are qualified to perform investigations. The second constraint is that the Pekanbaru Ombudsman does not have a fixed network to community organizations in Pekanbaru. This makes the Pekanbaru Ombudsman seem to walk alone without the support of public from behind. Third, the Pekanbaru ombudsman still has not an agenda of priorities yet going to be done, whereas the determination of the priority agenda can improve the performance of the Ombudsman in the eye of the public. Without the presence of priority agenda, the Pekanbaru Ombudsman has stuck to conduct merely organizational formality and administrative activities. The various constraints make the bargaining position that should be played by Ombudsman to the Pekanbaru Government become weaker. Moreover, the Ombudsman does not have the applicable authority to bind and force to the Government Pekanbaru when the Ombudsman finds the presence of errors.

From the description delivered by one informant, anti-corruption policy in the Pekanbaru Government by encouraging the involvement of many actors, including extraordinary institutions such as KPK and Ombudsman, cannot play a strategic role in the eradication of corruption. The failure is due to the existence of formal actors that are not supported with adequate resources. As a result, solutions offered through the formal involvement of actors cannot be effective to be implemented. In fact, the existence of many formal actors from various institutions is a practice of swelling government bureaucracy.

Prevention of corruption in the Pekanbaru City may also involve non-formal actors such as Non Government Organizations (NGOs), Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), mass media, and students. Non-formal actors can take on a strategic role when formal actors fail to supervise the practice of corruption in the Pekanbaru City. The existence of various them is an important element in strengthening the role of civil society in the front of Mayor.

Based on the data from the Pekanbaru government, there were 187 NGOs engaged in various social fields in 2012 (Kesbangpolimnas, 2013). This figure continues to increase from year to year because many new NGOs are established. Most NGOs registered by the Pekanbaru government are engaged in social and educational field. In fact, not many NGOs have concerns in the field of law and politics. NGOs more precisely focus their activities on the field of social based on the similarity in areas of origin, ethnicity, and others. As a result, efforts to significantly increase public participation in monitoring government and community empowerment in the development process are difficult because of the lack of NGOs working in related activities. Inevitably, the existence of many NGOs does not guarantee the creation of a strong public control climate on the performance of the bureaucracy in the Pekanbaru government. In the context of combating corruption in the Pekanbaru government, only two NGOs participate for monitoring such as Budget Transparency Forum (FITRA), and Indonesia Monitoring Development (IMD)

In fact, most of NGOs have dependency to the government with certain motives, such as to get money from Mayor. The existence of various NGOs that make use of institutions to get money has long been known among the people in the Pekanbaru city. It has become a scourge that NGOs that receive money from officials and contractors unofficially are referred to as red plate<sup>1</sup> NGOs. Phenomena of red plate NGOs in Pekanbaru continues to grow because NGOs are justified to receive a grant each year from the Pekanbaru Government.

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<sup>1</sup> In the Indonesia, government official car using red plate. Therefore, people using red plate as a term to the government.

Based on a detailed report on the implementation document of no-direct budget changes by the Pekanbaru Government, grants are awarded to various NGOs in Pekanbaru by IDR Rp. 41,775,500,000/ US \$ 2,982,536 (2013) and IDR Rp. 32,228,794,200/ US \$ 2,302,056 (2014). The amount of aid budget to NGOs by the Pekanbaru Government is actually more geared as an effort to defuse criticism against the Mayor and officials of bureaucracy underneath. However, if the aid is received by the NGO, then the conflict of interest will be unavoidable. This condition is more common to happen in NGOs in Pekanbaru because of the lack of funding owned. As a result, many NGOs are tempted to accept help from local budget of the Pekanbaru City Government so that the independence of NGOs becomes faded.

NGOs are not positioned parallel to the Mayor in making supervision. In contrast, NGOs let corruption practices happen. They often submit aid proposals to the Mayor rather than advocates and monitoring. If they do not get official aids, NGOs prefer extortion to certain individuals indicated corruption in government. This extortion practices are delivered overtly by visiting the office and calling the alleged corrupt officials earlier. It indicates that supervision by NGOs has not run properly. As results, NGOs and government partnership in a transactional atmosphere asserts NGOs cannot influence in the prevention of corruption in the Pekanbaru Government.

In line with most of NGOs performance in Pekanbaru, Pekanbaru also has civil society organizations (CSO) representing Malay culture called *Lembaga Adat Melayu* (LAM) or Malay Cultura Institute. LAM of Pekanbaru City was established in the late of 1970 as a medium to preserve the Malay culture becoming identity of Pekanbaru City. Therefore, the presence of LAM socio-culturally should have a powerful influence in the daily lives of people as well as in the government.

In its daily activities, LAM more affiliate with government. This can be found in one of the LAM tasks of providing customary title of *Datuk Bandar Setia Amanah* to Pekanbaru Mayor and *Datuk Muda Bandar* to the Vice Mayor of Pekanbaru. Utilization of “*Amanah*” word in every title has meaning in which every leader must be trustworthy and be a role model for the people.

**Picture 5**  
**Awarding the title by LAM to the Mayor and Vice Mayor in 2014**



Source:

<http://www.goriau.com/berita/pemerintahan/firdaus-jadi-datuk-bandar-setia-amanah-ayat-cahyadi-datuk-muda-bandar-setia-amanah.html>

Although the provision of this title shows great expectations to the Mayor and Vice Mayor as Malay indigenous stakeholders, the provision of this title is only given when they are serving the position and no longer applicable when not serving as Mayor and Vice Mayor. Inevitable, the provision of customary title is loaded with merely political interests. Arguments of awarding the title laden with political interest can be easily justified because the title can be given to someone who is ethnically non-Malay. In the context of Pekanbaru City today, the Vice Mayor of the ethnic non-Malays is also given customary title by LAM of Pekanbaru City. Inevitably, given the title by LAM applies bias due to a condition of granting the title that should have been addressed to a person with Malay ethnic background. This asserts that the custom is subjected to the authority of the Mayor and Vice Mayor. The subjection of custom makes power be concentrated in the figure of the Mayor and no party can pose control. Therefore, paternalistic culture that has been in government bureaucracy extends into the socio-cultural life of the community.

LAM affiliation to the government is stronger because most LAM members are officials in the Pekanbaru Government. Structure of LAM board consists of *Majelis Kerapatan Adat* (MKA), *Majelis Kehormatan* (MKH) and *Dewan Pengurus Harian* (DPH) more filled by former bureaucrats and active bureaucrats in the Pekanbaru Government. Head of *Majelis Kerapatan Adat* of LAM in Pekanbaru City today is a figure that has held strategic positions in the Riau provincial government and retired early in 2000. *Majelis Kehormatan* of LAM is an official automatically filled in by the Mayor and Deputy Mayor, while head of *Dewan Pengurus Harian* of LAM is led by a senior bureaucrat who currently serves as Assistant of Finance Administration in the Pekanbaru Government. Charging pattern of LAM board is not independent from the interests of the Mayor who politicizes the LAM. All of the central officials in LAM are persons who have patrons to the Mayor. In fact, figures from the inner in its lowest level in the structure of the Malay community are not accommodated in the



board. This shows that LAM is no more as a tool of the local authorities to gain greater community legitimacy.

The blending LAM political interests in the Mayor and Deputy Mayor makes LAM never run the control in the prevention of corruption in the Pekanbaru Government. Mechanism of granting *warkah* (a kind of appeal) that has been known in customs is never done by LAM to the Mayor although the phenomenon of corruption in the Pekanbaru City Government has been public secret. LAM is not able to deliver public unrests so that LAM activities just run ceremonial customs when asked by the government.

It is interesting to know that granting customary title and preferential treatment of LAM to the Mayor and Vice Mayor is not given freely. On behalf of the Malay cultural preservation, LAM of Pekanbaru City receives substantial budget support from the Pekanbaru Government as much as IDR Rp. 150 million/ US \$ 10,715 (2011), IDR Rp. 175 million/ US \$ 12,500 (2012), IDR Rp. 175 million/ US \$ 12,500 (2013) and IDR Rp. 175 million/ US \$ 12,500 (2014). Not only that, the Pekanbaru Government also grants land and builds a magnificent three-floor building in the city centre of Pekanbaru for LAM like in the picture 6.

**Picture 6**  
**LAM office in Pekanbaru**



Source: Private

With various aids acquired by LAM, LAM has become part of Mayor regime. Sometimes, LAM is also counterproductive with protecting the Mayor regime who commits corruption. Inability of LAM to revoke customary title of the Mayor who is involved in corruption insists that there is no social sanction applicable to officials who do corruption in the community. As a results, LAM as an informal institution in the society behaves permissive and protects the corrupt practices that occur in the government.

In contrast to the NGOs and other civil organizations, local mass media should have a more powerful access to the public in voicing corruption in the government. From historical side, development of media in Pekanbaru began with the establishment of the government media, ie, RRI (*Radio Republik Indonesia*) and TVRI (*Televisi Republik Indonesia*), established there in 1959 and 1997. The establishment of the two medias was a strategic political agenda for the New Order regime under Soeharto control to maintain the unity of the



State and prevent disintegration of the regions (Suryadi, 2005). Disintegration opportunities are enormous because Indonesia is a pluralistic country with consists of hundreds ethnicity. Therefore, realizing the existence of media in the region as a political instrument of the ruler at that time made the media in a position not independent.

The first private media established that got a strong public attention by people in Pekanbaru is Riau Pos newspaper. Riau Pos establishment is inseparable from large donations of Riau provincial government since 1990. The support of the local government to Riau Pos as the only one of local media used as a transmitter of news to the people about the success of the development in the region by local governments. Riau Pos received budget from the city government of Rp 170 million/ US \$ 12,143 (2013) and Rp. 285 million/ US \$ 20,358 (2014) to sign a page containing advertorial on Mayor's policies (Financial Report by Department of Public Relation Pekanbaru Local Government, 2013-2014). In addition, "some journalists from Riau Pos are often participated by using local government budgets facilitated by the Mayor of Pekanbaru when he conducts travel out of the city of Pekanbaru both domestic and abroad" (Interview Department of Administration, 27 January 2015). Various descriptions confirm that Riau Pos business is supported by a strong network into the local governance.

Various overviews of local media ranging from radio, television and newspapers in Pekanbaru show the success of the local media that cannot be separated from symbiosis mutualism between media owners and the head of the region. On the one hand, historically, the birth of the local media cannot be separated from the contribution of the government so that the public considers the local media as a local government media. The assumption is not wrong because some media such as Riau Pos receive budgetary support from the Pekanbaru Government for publication each year. According to the Pekanbaru government report, the Mayor allocated huge amount for the publication in media of IDR Rp. 3,294,000,000/ US \$ 235,286 (2013) and IDR Rp. 4,657,500,000/ US \$ 332,679 (2014). On the other hand, the Mayor can use of the media to proclaim successes as part of a political imagery. This makes the local media often considered no critical in the news because it is in line with the interests of the rulers in the region. Most of news about corruption is often censored by the owner of the company. Not critical newspaper owner is not separated from the business interests owned jointly with the Mayor. As a result, permissive response of media to the reporting on corruption of Mayor confirms the weakness of media in the prevention and eradication of corruption in local government. Media, which are essentially fifth pillar of democracy, become useless when dealing with local government. In contrast, media help corruption practices.

Other non-formal actors who can play a supervisory function to the Pekanbaru Government are students. The position of students as a catalyst in combating corruption issues shows a good track record considering the students play an important role in the delivery of reform in Indonesia in 1998. Based on that, the students joining in campus organization both internally and externally should be able to play a role in the prevention and eradication of corruption in the Pekanbaru Government. However, most of student organization tends to be pragmatic with make close relations with Mayor. In the Budget Report of Pekanbaru Government, Islamic Student Associations/ *Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam* of Pekanbaru City received a grant of IDR Rp. 20 million/ US \$ 1,429 (2012) and IDR Rp. 15 million/ US \$ 1,071 (2013). This assistance cannot be separated from the emotional similarity for a lot of local political officials that were formerly involved as activists in various student organizations. The emotional similarity continues to be nurtured by the formers of the organization as a form of indirect intervention to student organizations

considering almost all student organizations do not have an independent funding. This has caused the independence of the student organization on this day to tend to be degraded.

In some other universities in the Pekanbaru, the student organizations were once forbidden to set up. One example is the Abdurab University established since 1983 that had a new executive organization of students (BEM) in the year 2013. It was allegedly done by the owner of the university to minimize the threat of student movements. Student life is separated from the socio-political reality that develops around so that they are not sensitive and cannot do as an agent of control, ie, a role as a party that should control against authorities including local governments. As a result, they are stuck merely doing a ceremonial movement.

## **Conclusion**

A multi-actor strategy to eradicating corruption has emphasised once more the challenges in combating corruption. It becomes a complicated problem since accountability mechanism leads to dependency much on multi-actor role as a legal mechanism to control local governments. This problem becomes more acute in the government environment where power is shared by the multi-actors (Yang, 2011). As a result, accountability that runs by multi-actors is considered weak and not so prioritized. Some actors also have the potential to engage in a conflict of interest with other actors.

In Pekanbaru case, the role of multi-actor produces insignificant effect to reduce corruption in local governments. In contrast, most of actors made corrupt relations with Mayor. As a result, the anti corruption measurement need to be contextualized based on the nature of bureaucracy, culture, and political system. If the experts neglect that, the prospect for clean corruption in Pekanbaru is not encouraging.

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