

**IS POLITICAL DEVOLUTION ENHANCING THE PERFORMANCE OF HEALTH AND EDUCATION SECTORS?: LESSONS FROM A DECENTRALIZED MODE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN INDONESIA.**

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**Abstract**

The emergence of Decentralization thorough out the world has provoked question whether decentralization has played several important roles in fostering accountable and responsible governance. Furthermore, as the concept of governance expanded, so did thinking about the rationale, objectives, and forms of decentralization. Decentralization now encompasses not only the transfer of power, authority, and responsibility within the government, but also the sharing of authority and resources for shaping public policy within society. One of the important reasons that drives Indonesian government to deliver a democratic decentralization is political reasons. Over time there has been a remaining desire to decentralized Indonesia. This relates to the growing intention to local development throughout the country posed the need for political and administrative arrangement to meet the country's diversity.

This paper will describe, explore the nature and the process of political devolution in the context of local government in Indonesia, as well as assessing the political devolution performance for enhancing the quality of health and education sectors in one of the case study in two localities in Indonesia. This paper employ a model that combines Boex and Yilmaz (2010) framework and the Local Governance Barometer (Laberge, Moretto, Narang, & Wilde, 2010) framework for assessing Political devolution performances and its impact to the health and education sectors in a decentralized mode of government. This paper focuses on those issues, and on the opportunities for the local government to improve the most important basic needs of the people- education and health sectors in Indonesia.

Keyword: Decentralization, Political Devolution, Local Governance Performance

**Introduction**

**Political Devolution and the Notion of Democratic Local Governance**

The emergence of Decentralization throughout the world has provoked question whether decentralization has played several important roles in fostering accountable and

responsible governance. Furthermore, as the concept of governance expanded, so did thinking about the rationale, objectives, and forms of decentralization. Decentralization now encompasses not only the transfer of power, authority, and responsibility within government but also the sharing of authority and resources for shaping public policy within society. In this expanding concept of governance, decentralization practices can be categorized into at least four forms: administrative, political, fiscal, and economic (Cheema & Rondinelli, 2007). Administrative decentralization focusing on Deconcentration of central government structures and bureaucracies, delegation of central government authority and responsibility to semiautonomous agents of the state, and decentralized cooperation of government agencies performing similar functions through “twinning” arrangements across national borders. Fiscal decentralization focusing on the means and mechanisms for fiscal cooperation in sharing public revenues among all levels of government; for fiscal delegation in public revenue raising and expenditure allocation; fiscal autonomy for state, regional, or local governments. On the other hand, economic decentralization focuses on market liberalization, deregulation, privatization of state enterprises, and public-private partnerships.

Political decentralization or known as Political devolution focusing on organizations and procedures for increasing citizen participation in selecting political representatives and in making public policy; changes in the structure of the government through devolution of powers and authority to local units of government; power-sharing institutions within the state through federalism, constitutional federations, or autonomous regions and institutions and procedures allowing freedom of association and participation of civil society organizations in public decision-making. As one of the important aspects of decentralization, political devolution largely focusing on organizations and procedures for increasing citizen participation in selecting political representatives and in making public policy. Moreover, political devolution promotes the principles of democratization in the sense of assisting the development of responsive policies and services, provides more meaningful opportunities for participation in the political process. In short, will promote the values of ‘bringing government closer to its people. From this framework, we can understand decentralization provides the people a greater accessibility, accountability and responsibility toward its local jurisdiction of political and administrative authority.

Many theoretical reasons have been put forth over many years as to why democracies should exhibit better quality of government than autocracies. Promoting the values and the principle of democratization, decentralization also aims to increase the quality of government. The quality of government has been often associated with the term of governance (The Quality of Government Institute, Science, Sweden, & December, 2010). The most frequently used definition of governance is derived from World Bank. Governance is "the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes: (1) the process by

which governments are selected, monitored, and replaced, (2) the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies, and (3) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2004).

Moreover, Rondinelli and Cheema (2003) argue that decentralization process includes government structure and institutional reform and development of the legislature, then we see that decentralization will provide the opportunity to achieve better governance as this is seen as a pre-condition of good governance. On the other hand, the supporters of decentralization convince that decentralization will benefit and promote the quality of government as well as good governance. Said (2005) in his doctorate thesis acknowledged several theorists who endorsed decentralization as an important tools for improving the quality of government. Some of them are; Ostrom, Schoreder and Wayne (1993), Tiebout (1956), Inman and Rubinfield (1997). Those theorists believe that decentralized units of government have a greater incentive to be more efficient. This factor will lead subject to market like forces through competition from neighboring units and the ability of some citizens to shift elsewhere if they are dissatisfied. Treisman (2002) in his study of Decentralization and the Quality of Government explores three reasons for expecting that decentralization should improve the quality of government in the quality of government as follows: making locals officials more accountable, improving public officials knowledge of local conditions and facilitating a better matching of policies to local needs and interests.

In addition, a decentralized system of government also offers local sphere with a local wisdom that endorsed the fulfillment of localities interest. Thus, decentralized system will attach to the notion for supporting the potential of localities in a creative process than in a centralized government context. Highly centralized government tends to be unresponsive, inefficient as well as detaching localities with its local wisdom. A diversity of government units in autonomy is more likely to produce a diversity of policy responses. This paper employ a model that combines Boex and Yilmaz (2010) framework and the Local Governance Barometer (Laberge et al., 2010) framework for assessing Political devolution performances and its impact to the health and education sectors in a decentralized mode of government. This paper focuses on those issues, and on the opportunities for the local government to improve the most important basic needs of the people- education and health sectors in Indonesia. This paper will describe, explore the nature and the process of political devolution in the context of one of local government in Indonesia, the regency of Jember. Thus it will cover an assessment on the political devolution performance in the regency of Jember, especially with the focus whether the political devolution enhance the quality of health and education sectors in a decentralized mode of local government in Indonesia.

## Decentralization and the shape of local governance in Indonesia

Up to 1998, the process of decentralization in Indonesia was, at best, well planned but poorly implemented. The legal frameworks for implementing decentralization at provincial and local government levels, embedded in Law No 5/1974, held promise for decentralization. The system carrying out the implementation was itself centralist. After the fall of the Soeharto regime in 1998, the ensuing flurry of openness about the newly decentralized system has emerged in Indonesia. Law No 22/1999 is the new law producing new directions toward decentralization in Indonesia. The change is thrilling, and on a huge scale of, the law reverses the old directions of communication between central and local government while giving more responsibility to district government, cities and municipalities. Moreover, local government is now assigned to functions other than those explicitly handled by the local government. Several important points from the Law 22/1999 are:

1. Area division: the territory of Indonesia is divided into autonomous provincial Regions, regency regions, and municipal regions. A region has full authority in the field of governance
2. The complete and full implementation of local autonomy the responsibility Regency/city.
3. Head of Region is responsible to DPRD (Local Parliament), which also can propose dismissal of Head of Region to Central Government; and
4. This law also regulates village governance and its apparatus, which is the Village head and Village Representative Board.

In terms of public sector governance, the law 22/1999 was largely putting local government as the *avant garde* of public service delivery. Furthermore, the new law defines the mandatory public sector delivery to be handled by the local government;

1) Health; 2) Education and Culture; 3) Public works; 4) Agriculture; 5) Transportation; 6) Industry and trade; 7) Capital investment ; 8) Environment. The law 22/1999 was implemented on 1 January 2000.

The Law 22/1999 empowers local government with the power to regulating, allocating and utilizing national resources as well as fiscal balance between central and local government in accordance to democratic principle, public participation, equality, and justice as well as local potentials and diversity. Changes to the new law 22/1999 with the absence of a transition period, has given rise to various problems in decentralization in local government sphere. The lack capacity of local government organization, the emergence of the *Raja Kecil* (little Kings), the emergence of a conflict between the House of Representatives (DPRD) and head of the local government, and a variety of other problems are some of the issues that

attach to the early stage of decentralization in Indonesia. The following table will list several lists of the differences between the Law No 5/1974 and the Law No 22/1999

Table 1. Several Aspects of differences between the Law on Decentralization

| Aspect                           | Law No 5/1974   | Law No 22/199   | Law No 32/2004  |
|----------------------------------|---|---|---|
| Decentralization Model           | Deconcentrations and Delegation   | Devolution  | Devolution  |
| Functional system                | Level Approach  | Size and Content Approach   | Size and Content Approach                                     |
| Accountability                   | Local Government responsible to Central Government                              | Local Government responsible to Local government & parliament                             | Local Government responsible to Local government & parliament |
| Local Government                 | Local Government referring to Head of The Local Government and Local Parliament | Local Government referring to Head of the local government and its local government staff | Head of Local government and Local Parliament                 |
| The Function of local government | Limited function of Local Government  | Local Government reserved to 11 rights of functions                                       | Local Government reserved to 16 rights of functions           |

Source: Constructed from Kaho, Bayo, Parlindungan, Jamson, and Mada (2012)

The substance of the Law No 22/1999 was consider vague in its several parts, in results this triggers a conflict between the central and the local government, a conflict that mold by different interpretation and different understanding on the division of authority, Local government institution, general allocation funds (DAU –*Dana Alokasi Umum*) and territorial boundary issues and several other issue (Kaho et al., 2012).

Conflict within the rise of decentralization in Indonesia moved the national government to introduced new law on Local government to address several problems that emerge during the early stage of decentralization. The confusion in the law 22/1999 on the early stage of decentralization implementation was corrected by the Indonesian government by introducing law 32/2004 on local government. The new law aims to synergize the arrangement of local government as well as addressing various problems that arise.

Moreover, law 32/2004 employs “concurrence functions”. These functions means the concurrency principle is applied to any government affairs. Thus, whatever and whenever the central government exercises its power, it means that provincial authorities and the authorities of the regency/municipality have the similar power to exercise it, only its scale is different. Thus, if the central government has the authority that covers national or inter-provincial, then province shall have the authority that covers province or inter-regent / municipal, while municipality or city has the authority those cover 31 government affairs which are decentralized by the central government. Law 32/2004 attempts to correct some deficiency

produce by the confusing law 22/1999 by stating some new regulations, such as PP No. 38/2007 to clarify and to provide the detail of the distribution of authorities. In this regulation, aside from the six authorities which are maintained by the central government, there are thirty one other government tasks (*urusan pemerintahan*) which are distributed to the all tiers of government.

### **Decentralized mode of government: A Tale of Political Devolution from the Regency of Jember**

Although it offers some benefits in fostering local development, still there are unresolved arguments over the merits of political devolution for enhancing the health and education sectors a decentralized mode of government, particularly in a developing country. Political devolution in Indonesia is marked by the arrival of democratization at local government level by local election of heads of the regional government (*Pilkada—Pemilihan Kepala Daerah*) and local legislative election (*Pileg—Pemilihan Legislatif*). Recent development of *Pilkada* in Indonesia has shown some problems concerning corruption, money politics, and strong patronage relationships between candidates and voters (Hadiz, 2010; Mietzner, 2010). While on the another venue, Indonesian legislature are lacking accountability when it comes to making policies that reflect the voters preference (Sherlock, 2010). Futheromnore, political devolution in a decentralized mode of government compounded with the unpreparedness of civil society at local level. Thus, in exchange for votes and loyalty, voters expect candidates to care for them not only through cash handouts at rallies, but also through other donations and provisions during election time (Simandjuntak, 2012). This condition has largely creates off-budget and illegal transfers among candidates and voters, and have resulted in a significant number of corruption cases against district members of local legislative and heads of regional government (Mietzner & Aspinall, 2010).

The first *Pilkada* in the regency of Jember was taking place in 2005. MZA Djalal and Kusen Andalas were the first Bupati and Wakil Bupati directly elected by the people in Jember. The winning of DJAKA (acronym of MZA Djalal and Kusen Andalas) couples is understandable; MZA Djalal, the Bupati candidate was a high ranking bureaucrat in the East Java province before he moved back to his home town of Jember. As a bureaucrat, Djalal has manifested a long, strong experience in the provincial government of East Java. His capability as an experienced bureaucrat and its advantage as a “*Putra Daerah*” (local figure) boosting his popularity. At the same time, his running partner, Kusen Andalas, was also known for a steadily-run term, serving as one of the vice of the head of the local legislature from the PDIP party. In short, both Djalal and Kusen were candidates with experienced backgrounds as a bureaucrat and as a politician, respectively. The winning of *Djaka* in the first *Pilkada* in the regency of Jember actually echoes with what happened all across Indonesia; the winning of

bureaucrats that were paired with local politicians. Rinakit (2005) found that almost 87% of the winnings in these regional elections were won by incumbents and local bureaucrats who were, generally, paired with businessmen. In relation to the governance of allocating resources for the health and education sectors, the first *Pilkada* did not produce any instant effect for the development of health and education sectors in Jember. Moreover, in the middle of 2006, the new Bupati of Jember, MZA Djalal, had to face a prominent problem in the education sector, the high number of illiteracy in Jember. The Bupati of Jember had to acknowledge the 31,038 people that were illiterate.

The sub-districts of Jelbuk, Silo and Ledokombo possessed a significant number of illiteracy in the regency of Jember in 2006. In total there are 196,340 people living in the sub-districts of Jelbuk, Silo and Ledokombo, or roughly 10 % of Jember's population. Although 10% is a relatively small number, electorally speaking, these three districts are widely known as the traditional vote-getter areas for the PKB and PDI-P, the two parties that contributed to the winning of MZA Djalal and Kusen Andalas.

The PKB and PDIP political endorsements contributed highly to the winning of *Djaka*, but the endorsement is rather a practical political move rather than an idealistic endorsement that could benefit the electoral jurisdiction of PKB and PDIP. Moreover, there is no real impact for the winning of *Djaka* to the voters in the electoral jurisdiction of PKB and PDIP. This has largely confirmed Buehler and Tan (2007) notion on the collapsing relationship between political candidates and parties after the *Pilkada* election day.

In the case of Jember, the low connection between the parties and the candidate exhibit low institutionalization of the local issues for both political parties and the winning candidate, *Djaka*. What happened in Jember reveals how this collapsing connection exhibits the artificial and pragmatic connection between the party and the candidate. The pragmatism connection between political parties and the candidate in the *Pilkada* is misleading, as well as producing a non-favorable outcome for leveraging *Pilkada* as one of the political momentums that contributes to the development of health and education sector. At this point we can conclude that a decentralized mode of government, political devolution is far from empowering the development of better governance for health and education sectors in local level.

The second *Pilkada* in the regency of Jember was taking place in 2009. Once more the incumbent of *Djaka* managed to win the second *Pilkada*. The winning of incumbent actually has set an alarm off for the development of decentralization, especially political devolution. Smith (1985) perceived decentralization facilitates a democratic training facilitates for local political leadership. This provides prospective local political leaders an opportunity for developing their skills in the policy-making process. Furthermore, decentralization will provide local political stakeholder with a training ground that enhances local wisdom. Thus,

this will benefit the local political stakeholders for developing their skill in the arena of policy making at local level.

Finally, this will create a talent pool that should enhance the quality of the local and regional politician. What has happened in the regency of Jember is demonstrating the opposite effect other than was proposed by Smith (1985). This is largely because the fact *MZA Djalal* and *Kusen Andalas* are closely associated as the “local kids” of Jember, it is important to remember that *MZA Djalal* is an ex-bureaucrat who was not born from the local political seedbeds of the area. On the other hand, *Kusen Andalas* is the head of PDIP of Jember, a position that entitled him to make strategic decisions for the PDIP. One of the important decisions that he is responsible for his nomination of the candidates for *Pilkada*. It is not surprising to see him again as a running mate for *MZA Djalal*.

After winning the *Pilkada* on July 7<sup>th</sup>, 2010, the ministry of Internal affairs issued a letter of non-activation for their positions as *Bupati* and *Wakil Bupati* on November 9<sup>th</sup>, 2010. This was largely because of a case of corruption that related to them. Back in 2004, *MZA Djalal* was named a suspect in the corruption case of Asphalt Machine, while he was still holding the position as a bureaucrat for the provincial government in East Java. Additionally, *Kusen Andalas* was named as a suspect for the corruption case of the Jember operational fund in 2004 when he was serving as the vice of the heads of *DPRD*. This event largely depicts the local political constellation in Jember as still being in its infancy stage. The political scene is far from producing a fully functional devolution that is required to promote a healthy process of political recruitment. In the case of Jember, some of the parties are reasonably blinded by the power vested by the incumbent; they are failing to recognize the importance of endorsing a local candidate that responds to the people’s hopes and aspirations. Instead, the trend of endorsing a candidate who has been lawfully accused of corruption seems to be emerging.

Ufen (2011) believes that Indonesian *Pilkada* contributes to the fragmentation between political parties and candidate’s at the local level. Decentralization has been delivering a profound administrative and political devolution at the local level, resulting in pressures from the political parties to delegate power to local/regional levels and to non-party actors. These non-Party members include bureaucrats and even some politicians with weak ties to parties. The incumbent winnings in the regency of Jember vividly affirm Ufen (2011) notions of the unhealthy and fragmented relationship between the parties and the candidates during the processes of *Pilkada*.

Another venue of political devolution is the direct legislative election (*Pileg*). This has mainly reshaped the structure and local political constellation, especially for political party in a decentralized mode of government. In Jember, political party constellation under a new decentralized resembles the political party structure at the national level, which is dominated



by religious based parties and nationalist parties (Tan, 2006). In addition, the dynamics of party politics in Jember are still marked by *aliran* (streams) where the biggest political parties are still identified with specific *milieu*. Decentralization has brought the first direct election in the regency of Jember for choosing political party candidates for the DPRD thorough *Pileg*. Although the *Pileg* intended to develop a local political leader with a preference to local issues, especially in the health and education sectors, the output of first *Pileg* and its impact has been relatively low to the improvement of governance of allocating resources for health and education sectors. Prior to 2007 the *Bupati* of Jember has acknowledged there are 31,038 people that are illiterate in the regency of Jember. The high number of illiterate people in the regency of Jember is a serious matter and awareness should be raised in the legislature, with the electoral areas of Jelbuk, Silo and Ledokombo being represented. In total there are 196,340 people living in the sub-districts of Jelbuk, Silo and Ledokombo, roughly 10% of Jember's population. Although 10% is a relatively small number, politically speaking, these three districts are widely known as the traditional vote-getter areas for PKB and PDI-P, two parties that hold twenty-four seats in the DPRD. Moreover, the absence of political party's initiatives at the local level indicates weak knots between political parties and their constituent for a specific issue.

Although decentralization has the potential for facilitating political devolution the members of DPRD elected by the first *Pileg* in 2005 confirming how political devolution at the local government level fail to achieve Smith's (1985) ideal notions of decentralization. The notion perceived decentralized government will provide a localized training ground for local politicians to produce a designated policy preference that reflects local interest. The absence of policy-making initiatives for improving health and education sectors during the period of 2005-2009 (first *Pileg*) ratify how most of the political parties in Jember are idle for maximizing political devolution for developing a local political arena that resonates and delivers a designated outcome for their constituent.

Second *Pileg* in Jember was taking place in 2009 and shown some changing of the political landscape in Jember. Several traditional parties like PDI- P, Golkar and PKB still dominating the local political sphere; however, parties with a nationalist ideology such as the Democrat Party (PD) are beginning to champion the local political sphere in Jember. The domination of PD in the regency of Jember could be understood as the result of the trickle-down effect on the popularity of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), one of the prominent founders of PD. Moreover, the internal conflict within the central structure of PKB in Jakarta delivers a positive outcome for PKNU, a party that practically has the same base as religious mass organizations, such as PKB, which is Nahdlatul Ulama.

Overall, the results of the second *Pileg* in the regency of Jember still largely indicate how the political parties at the local level are highly influenced by the party structure in the central government. The PD party has championed the DPRD with nine seats, as well as claiming the head of the local parliament, (Ketua DPRD). This largely proves how the dominance of PD at the national level could play a significant role in boosting votes at the local level. Although the second *pile* indicates prevailing problems with the system of party institutionalism at local level and , which the event above largely confirms.

According to Mainwaring and Scully (1995), institutionalized party systems are mainly defined as a system with regularized inter-party competition and parties characterized by strong roots in society, legitimacy, and highly-developed organization. Furthermore, the institutionalized party systems can be found in the most advanced industrial democracies while also being able to fulfill one of their most important democratic functions: allowing voters to be able to hold the government accountable. On the other hand, in relatively weak institutionalized party systems, parties are often weak as organizations and its social roots are frail leading to instability, as voters float from one party to another. Thus, it is important to underline there has been an absence of significant policy from the legislature at local level in improving the quality of health and education sector in the localities. This largely confirms the second *Pileg* output has not performed adequately for delivering a strong party capacity that reflecting the interest of the greater society in Jember, a better health and education sector improvement.

The third *Pileg* in Jember was taking place in 2014 and the sense of weak political party institutionalism at local level is largely still prevails. One vivid indicator for this is the debate surround the local government plan to conduct student virginity test as one of crucial element which determine student graduation. The gap of preference between the DPRD and the people of Jember on the issue of the student virginity test could be understood as a signpost for the failure of the local legislature of capturing the preference of the people. The difference of the interests between people and the members of the legislature is actually affirming Sherlock (2010) arguments on how the Indonesian legislature is lacking accountability when it comes to making policies that reflect the voter preference. The case of student virginity testing in the regency of Jember has vividly captured how the members of the local parliament are failing to capture the preference of the people, especially in the interest of the better management of the education sector.

The event above also acknowledges the failure of political parties Jember for institutionalizing the governance of health and education as a priority. A study on the institutionalism of political parties of Indonesia at the local government level by Buehler and Tan (2007) confirms low institutionalization of political party systems in Indonesia, especially in the local government context. The event above also acknowledges the failure of political


parties Jember for institutionalizing the governance of health and education as a priority. A study on the institutionalism of political parties of Indonesia at the local government level by Buehler and Tan (2007) confirms low institutionalization of political party systems in Indonesia, especially in the local government context. Furthermore, a key informant from the leading political party in Jember concludes the problem of political party institutionalism is adding some discrepancies to the process of allocating resources for the health and education sectors in Jember.

*“Some faction in the DPRD mostly only focuses their attention on how big the budget (resources) is. Most of the political party faction at the DPRD will not be going to bother on how the local government uses the budget, or guarding the implementation process of the resources, especially in the health and education sectors, which is very complex. Although most parties in the regency of Jember acknowledge those two sectors are important, but it is rare to see how they are monitoring the resource allocation implementation process” (Interview with Mlumj, Feb 2014).*

The explanation above actually underlines several crucial problems surrounding the governance of the health and education sectors in the regency of Jember, such as the latent problems of the high number of illiterate people (Solicha, 2014) and the high maternal mortality rate among other regencies in East Java (Juliatmoko, 2013). Furthermore, the problem of health and education sector in the regency of Jember above signaling the low capacity of political parties for responding to address the issues on the governance of health and education sectors.

### **The Performance of Political Devolution in the Governance of Health and Education**

The performance of each indicator for political devolution that contributes in fostering development of health and education sector in the regency of Jember is actually fairly low



*Figure 1.* The Performance of Political Devolution in the governance of health and education sector in Jember

For assessing political devolution performances and its impact to the health and education sectors in a decentralized mode of government, this paper employs a model that combines Boex and Yilmaz (2010) framework and the Local Governance Barometer (Laberge et al., 2010) framework. The barometer largely exhibits the performance of four indicators that contribute to the governance of political devolution capacity in the regency of Jember, they are: local political structure, structure and quality of local political systems, the nature of political party systems, and local political participation and accountability. The local political structure and the nature of political party system performance in the regency of Jember are performing fairly poor with the score of -0.10 point and -0.05 point respectively. On the contrary, the performance of the structure and the quality of local electoral systems and the local political participation and accountability showing a different result. Although showing a positive performance with both of them scoring of 0.10 point this result actually not far from the neutral score. In other words, this score actually represents a fairly low performance on the robustness of the participation, accountability and the quality of local electoral results in the regency of Jember in fostering a further development of the health and education sectors.

One of the purposes of decentralization is the transfer of political devolution from the central government to the local government. This is actually bringing democracy closer to the people. Moreover, several theorists agree with the relation between decentralization and the spread of democratic principles of local government. Among the theorists is Smith (1985), Burki, Perry, and Dillinger (1999), Blair (2000), (Grindle, 2007), Ahmad and Brosio (2009), and one should not forget to mention international donors like World Bank (2000) that has

been supporting and endorsing decentralization. In the case of Jember, political devolution largely inadequate to play as a driving force delivering the greater improvement for the health and education sector through its local democratic political seedbeds. The absence of strong local political leadership confirmed that political devolution in Jember largely was still at infant stage, especially for fostering the local political stakeholders in contributing development for the health and education sector. Moreover, the weak political structure of executive, legislative and political parties in Jember for delivering a well grounded policy for improving health and education sector is vividly displayed by the lack of political initiatives by the political structure for capturing the interest of the citizen for the greater needs of better service delivery in health and education sector.

On the other hand, although political devolution delivers a democratic local electoral system by *Pilkada* and *Pileg* at local level, both of them in Jember has been malfunctioning. This is related to the lack of local political leadership in Jember in furthering development for health and education sector. As I have outlined previously, decentralization actually creates a gap between the political party structure in the central and the local government level. This gap is largely creates a domination of central political party structure over the political party structure at local government level. This domination is actually considered crucial in hampering local political party structure for developing or initiating a local political seedbed that contributes to the development of local government, especially in health and education sector. Moreover, a weak institutionalized local level party structure makes governance difficult in a number of ways. When parties tend to rise and fall so rapidly, it becomes difficult to hold members of legislature accountable because of a lack of connection between a party and specific policies enacted.

## **Conclusion**

Although Cheema and Rondinelli (2007) notion endorses the view of decentralization has the potential for delivering political devolution at local level its largely accurate, but the results in Jember showed political devolution only produced a weak party structure at local government level, especially for responding to a crucial sector issues in local government level, such health and education sector. Thus, it is important to note that the political party structure at local government level are often ill attuned to constituents' interests, as a result, legislators as a party represented in the parliament fail to produce strong, well grounded policies that reflect the political parties social roots interest.

In Jember, decentralization fails to produce a stimulus for the political party to develop an underlying structure to respond to the interests of constituent at the local level. This will

result a difficult for the voters to discipline the political parties, as well as their candidate who win in *Pilkada*. In other words, the political devolution only luring citizen at the regency Jember with the illusion for better governance of health and education sectors, while on the other hand, political devolution fails to produce a strong local political infrastructure that permits a direct-measurable citizen control over the crucial process of allocating resources as well as the development of the health and education sector in the regency of Jember.

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